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Abstract
Previous studies have demonstrated that highly narcissistic individuals perceive themselves as grandiose and devaluate and
sometimes overvalue others. These results are mainly based on behavioural data, but we still know little about the neural
correlates underlying, such as perceptional processes. To this end, we investigated event-related potential components (ERP)
of visual face processing (P1 and N170) and their variations with narcissism. Participants (N = 59) completed the Narcissistic
Admiration and Rivalry Questionnaire and were shown pictures of their own face, a celebrity’s face, and a stranger’s face.
Variations of P1 and N170 with Admiration and Rivalry were analysed using multilevel models. Results revealed moderating
effects of both narcissism dimensions on the ERP components of interest. Participants with either highAdmiration or lowRivalry
scores showed a lower P1 amplitude when viewing their own face compared with when viewing a celebrity’s face. Moreover, the
Self-Stranger difference in the N170 component (higher N170 amplitude in the Self condition) was larger for higher Rivalry
scores. The findings showed, for the first time, variations of both narcissism dimensions with ERPs of early face processing. We
related these effects to processes of attentional selection, an expectancy-driven perception, and the mobilisation of defensive
systems. The results demonstrated that by linking self-report instruments to P1 and N170, and possibly to other ERP components,
we might better understand self- and other-perception in narcissism.
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Today’s concept of narcissism is rooted in ancient my-
thology. In Ovid’s Metamorphoses (1916, pp. 153-155),
the author describes how Narcissus falls in love with
himself, seeing his face in the silver white water of an
unclouded fountain. Nothing can release his eyes from
his face, and he falls into deep despair realising that he
cannot reach what he sees. Although this narrative—
depicting Narcissus’ perception of his face—marks the
starting point of our modern understanding of narcissism,
to date, we still know little about face perception in
narcissism and its underlying psychological and neuro-
physiological processes.
To date, mainly behavioural studies have suggested
that narcissistic people are very fond of their own faces.
For example, narcissism, at least in men, was shown to
be positively associated with the number of selfies
posted on social media platforms (Sorokowski et al.,
2015). Furthermore, adolescents high in narcissism rated
posted photos of themselves as being more glamorous,
more fashionable, and more physically attractive com-
pared with less narcissistic adolescents (Ong et al.,
2011). It also was postulated that people high in narcis-
sism use their appearance to signal their actual or desired
status (Vazire, Naumann, Rentfrow, & Gosling, 2008)
and to gain attention and admiration by others
(Sedikides, Gregg, Cisek, & Hart, 2007). The special
relationship between highly narcissistic individuals with
their appearance and their face, further manifests in the
item: “I like looking at myself in the mirror,” which was
incorporated into the most widely used narcissism inven-
tory (Narcissistic Personality Inventory; Raskin & Terry,
1988).
Using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), a
recent study demonstrated, however, that while viewing their
face, compared with viewing friends’ or strangers’ faces,
highly narcissistic men showed more neural activity in the
anterior cingulate cortex; the authors interpreted this finding
* Markus Mück
markus.mueck@uni-koeln.de
1 Department of Individual Differences and Psychological
Assessment, University of Cologne, Pohligstr 1,
50969 Köln, Germany
https://doi.org/10.3758/s13415-020-00818-0
Published online: 14 August 2020
Cognitive, Affective, & Behavioral Neuroscience (2020) 20:1041–1055
as an indicator of a negative affect during self-relevant pro-
cessing (Jauk, Benedek, Koschutnig, Kedia & Neubauer,
2017). The inconsistency between the mentioned behavioural
data and this neurophysiological finding shows that we still
know little about the processes underlying self-perception in
narcissism.
Because individuals do not live alone in this world and
interact with others daily, other people’s faces also might be
important cues in a social context for more narcissistic in-
dividuals. The existing literature showed that narcissistic
people often dictate the nature of these interactions. For
example, Back et al. (2013) postulated that individuals high
in narcissism use social encounters to stabilise their self-
worth by devaluing their interaction partners. Furthermore,
Campbell and Green (2007) emphasised that highly narcis-
sistic individuals use social interactions as an opportunity
to be admired. In some instances, individuals high in nar-
cissism even overvalue other people—for example, be-
cause of their high social reputation—when this serves the
stabilisation of their own grandiosity (Campbell & Green,
2007). Such social interactions usually begin with the per-
ception of another person’s face (Ofan, Rubin, & Amodio,
2011). Thus, neurophysiological correlates of face process-
ing also could be informative for narcissism-related varia-
tions in the perception of other people.
To assess narcissism-related variations in face processing
on a neural level, we investigated neurophysiological corre-
lates of face perception using event-related potentials (ERPs).
We opted for this approach, because the use of ERPs is ben-
eficial to identify variations in the temporal dynamics of neu-
ral processes—an important aspect in social cognitive and
affective neuroscience (Amodio, Bartholow, & Ito, 2013).
Considering temporal dynamics seems to be especially im-
portant when studying narcissism. With a priming paradigm,
Horvath and Morf (2009) showed that, at an early stage of
information processing, highly narcissistic individuals were
hypersensitive to words representing worthlessness but, at a
later stage, automatically and successfully avoid experiencing
worthlessness. They argued that the uncertainty surrounding
the existence of implicit experiences of worthlessness in nar-
cissism had been caused by the negligence of temporal dy-
namics in most study designs.
The ERP approach, however, enabled us to study differ-
ent processing stages with a high temporal resolution. Most
importantly, it allowed us to investigate processes imme-
diately after stimulus onset. Thus, this approach provided
insights into rather automatic responses that are difficult or
impossible to detect with other methods often applied in
the research on narcissism, such as self-report (Tamborski
& Brown, 2011), clinical observations (Afek, 2018) or
fMRI (Jauk et al., 2017). Specifically, the current study
used two well-studied components of the ERP associated
with face processing: P1 and N170.
Face Processing Components
First, we assessed the P1 component, which peaks between 80
and 130ms post-stimulus (Hillyard &Anllo-Vento, 1998) and
originates both from the dorsal extrastriate cortex and from the
fusiform gyrus (Di Russo, Martínez, Sereno, Pitzalis, &
Hillyard, 2001). Although this early component varies with
low-level information of visual stimuli (Rossion & Jacques,
2008), P1 has also been found to correlate with conscious
perception: It was shown that the P1 amplitude is enhanced
when participants consciously perceive stimuli compared with
when they do not consciously perceive them (Mathewson,
Gratton, Fabiani, Beck, & Ro, 2009; Roeber, Trujillo-
Barreto, Hermann, O’Shea, & Schroger, 2008; Kornmeier &
Bach, 2006; Pins, 2003). Railo, Koivisto, and Revonsuo
(2011) postulated, however, that the P1 reflects a preconscious
attentional selection process which controls the visual content
that enters into consciousness. This sensory gain control
mechanism is manifested either as attentional suppression or
as attentional facilitation, occurring at an early stage of infor-
mation processing, before the stimulus is fully identified and
recognised (Hillyard, Vogel, & Luck 1998). Interestingly, the
emotional significance of stimuli affects early attention-
modulating processes (Vuilleumier, 2005). It is argued that
via neuronal projections to the sensory cortices, the amygdala
can influence and reinforce the perception of emotional and
intrinsically salient events—a process that is termed emotional
attention (Vuilleumier, 2005). This was demonstrated in sev-
eral studies investigating the association between negatively
valenced stimuli and the P1 amplitude. For example, en-
hanced P1 amplitudes were found in socially phobic patients
while seeing faces (Kolassa, Kolassa, Musial, & Miltner,
2007) or angry faces (Mueller et al., 2008), in spider phobics
while viewing spiders (Michalowski et al., 2009), in partici-
pants seeing fearful faces (Batty & Taylor, 2003), and in re-
sponse to negatively compared with positively valenced stim-
uli (Smith, Cacioppo, Larsen, & Chartrand, 2003). To sub-
stantiate the association between the emotional valence of
stimuli with the P1 amplitude, Rotshtein et al. (2010) showed
that patients with amygdala damage did not show an increased
P1 in response to fearful faces compared with neutral ones.
Smith et al. (2003) highlighted that the P1 amplification to
negative stimuli pointed to a mechanism at a very early stage
of information processing, which seemed to ascribe valence to
sensory input, leading to a preference for negative over posi-
tive stimuli in the process of perception. The authors argued
that, from an evolutionary perspective, this mechanism is es-
sential for reacting quickly and appropriately to (life-) threat-
ening events.
The second ERP component that we focused on in the
current research was the N170 component. This component
is discussed to reflect higher-order face-sensitive brain
processes—the structural encoding of faces—as its amplitude
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is higher for faces compared to other non-face objects
(Rossion & Jacques, 2011). N170 shows its local maximum
at posterior electrode sites, i.e., above the visual cortical areas,
and peaks around 170 ms after presentation of the stimulus
(Bentin, Allison, Puce, Perez, & McCarthy, 1996; Eimer,
2000; Rossion & Jacques, 2011; Eimer, 2011). Even though
the perceptual processes underlying the N170 can also be
recruited for other non-face visual stimuli of expertise (for
example birds and dogs [Tanaka & Curran, 2001], or finger-
prints [Busey & Vanderkolk, 2005]), this component, in par-
ticular, seems to reflect the higher-level process of perceiving
a visual stimulus as a face (see Rossion & Jacques, 2011).
With regard to the current study, the so-called self-effect of
N170 is essential (Keyes, Brady, Reilly, & Foxe, 2010); this
describes larger N170 amplitudes when participants see their
own face comparedwith when they see the face of a friend or a
stranger (defined by an N170 difference). Given the self-im-
portance, narcissistic people feel for themselves (Krizan &
Herlache, 2018), we assumed that this N170 self-effect might
even be enhanced in narcissism. Furthermore, previous re-
search has demonstrated that the social significance of other
faces leads to an increase in the N170 amplitude. Participants
viewing a member ostensibly of their own social group—
arbitrarily assigned by the experimenters—showed a larger
N170 compared with ostensible out-group faces, suggesting
a motivational preference in the encoding of faces of in-group
members (Ratner & Amodio, 2013). Additionally, increased
N170 amplitudes also were demonstrated for white partici-
pants while observing black faces compared with white faces,
but only if the participants were frightened of showing racial
prejudice (Ofan, Rubin, & Amodio, 2014) or had implicit pro-
white attitudes (Ofan et al., 2011). Moreover, it was shown
that social conformity regarding attractiveness ratings led to
smaller N170 amplitudes (Schnuerch, Koppehele-Gossel, &
Gibbons, 2015). Given the importance of interpersonal self-
regulation for narcissistic grandiosity (Campbell & Green,
2007), the illustrated effects, concerning the interplay between
social significance and the N170 amplitude, might be moder-
ated by narcissism.
Narcissistic Admiration and Rivalry Concept
The current literature provides a variety of concepts about
narcissism, each with different or slightly different foci
(Pincus & Lukowitsky, 2010). To our knowledge, P1 and
N170 were not used to investigate variations with any nar-
cissism concept in previous studies. To explore variations
of these ERP components with narcissism, we focused on
the Narcissistic Admiration and Rivalry Concept (NARC;
Back et al., 2013). The NARC, a concept allowing a di-
mensional investigation of narcissism, postulates two dis-
tinct pathways according to which narcissistic people can
maintain their grandiose self: Admiration and Rivalry.
Both pathways incorporate affective, motivational, cogni-
tive and behavioural processes. Admiration is associated
with a strategy of maintaining grandiosity by attaining
the admiration of other people (assertive self-enhance-
ment). This strategy is associated with the aim to present
one’s uniqueness and specialness, with fantasies about
one’s grandiosity and with charming behaviour that can
lead to positive social outcomes. These positive social ex-
periences, in turn, drive the grandiose self and further re-
inforce the assertive self-enhancement strategy. Rivalry,
on the other hand, reflects the process in which one’s gran-
diosity is defended from attacks by other people (antago-
nistic self-protection). This self-defence is linked with the
striving to prove superiority, with the cognitive strategy of
devaluing others and with aggressive behaviour. This self-
protection mechanism leads to negative social outcomes
which, in turn, stabilises the negative view of others and
ultimately results in a strengthening of this antagonistic
self-protection strategy.
Thus, the NARC postulates that the Admiration dimension
reflects the tendency of perceiving oneself as (more or less)
grandiose while the Rivalry dimension reflects the tendency of
perceiving others (more or less) as inferior. We assumed that
these differences in perception might also be related to varia-
tions in P1 and N170 while viewing oneself or other people.
By describing these differences in perception at a psycholog-
ical level, the NARC seemed to be a suitable model for inves-
tigating variations in face processing at a neural level.
Objective of the Present Research
We showed participants three different kinds of faces (the
participant’s own face, the face of a stranger, and a celebrity’s
face) and explored variations in P1 and N170 that can be
explained by variations in Admiration and Rivalry. First, we
investigated the general effects of Face Type on P1 and N170
and tried to replicate the so-called self-effect on N170 (Keyes
et al., 2010). Second, we tested whether both Admiration and
Rivalry moderated the effect of Face Type on P1 and N170.
Based on the outlined theoretical considerations, one’s own
face should be an important stimulus for people with high
Admiration: Viewing one’s own face poses an opportunity
to feel grandiose. A stranger´s face should be an important
stimulus for people high in Rivalry: Viewing a stranger’s face
poses an opportunity to devaluate another person. Thus, the
importance of the respective stimulus should lead to an inten-
sified face processing reflected in variations in the P1 and the
N170 component. We, therefore, investigated if P1 and N170
varied for participants high inAdmirationwhile viewing one’s
own face compared with viewing a celebrity’s and a stranger’s
face, and if P1 and N170 varied for participants high in
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Rivalry while viewing a stranger’s face. Furthermore, we as-
sumed variations of either Admiration or Rivalry with P1 and
N170 when viewing a celebrity’s face since Campbell and
Green (2007) pointed out that the affiliation with people of
high social status, also, poses an opportunity for highly nar-
cissistic individuals to stabilize their grandiosity.
We supposed that both ERP components vary with
Admiration and Rivalry. However, given the vast and com-
plex P1 and N170 literature, we could not draw any directed
hypotheses on how the two personality traits might affect the
ERP components. The study was, above all, explorative; we
aimed at generating data providing first insights into a better
understanding of early face processing in narcissism.
Methods
Participants
We recruited 61 right-handed participants studying at the
University of Cologne who received course credit for partici-
pation. Two participants had to be removed from this sample
because of technical problems, resulting in a final sample of
59 participants (42 females, 17 males, no one identified as
diverse; mean age = 25.45 years, SD = 6.22). All participants
reported that they had never suffered from a neurological ill-
ness and had either normal or corrected-to-normal vision. The
study was approved by the ethics committee of the German
Psychological Association. Participants gave written consent.
Psychometric assessment
Narcissism was measured using the 18-Items Narcissistic
Admiration and Rivalry Questionnaire (NARQ, Back et al.,
2013). The NARQ measures the affective-motivational, cog-
nitive, and behavioural aspects of both facets of narcissism
(Admiration and Rivalry). The Admiration scale incorporates
three subscales, including Grandiose Fantasies (cognitive as-
pect), Striving for Uniqueness (affective-motivational aspect),
and Charmingness (behavioural aspect). The Rivalry scale
consists of another three subscales, including Devaluation
(cognitive aspect), Striving for Supremacy (affective-motiva-
tional aspect), and Aggressiveness (behavioural aspect).
Participants respond on a 6-point Likert scale ranging from 1
= not agree at all to 6 = agree completely. The internal con-
sistency of scores on the Admiration subscale was α = 0.76,
the internal consistency for Rivalry scores was α = 0.82. The
sample’s mean and standard deviation for Admiration were
3.02 ± 0.62 (range: 1.67 to 4.33, centred range: −1.35 to 1.32)
and for Rivalry 1.92 ± 0.71 (range: 1.00 to 4.00, centred range:
−0.92 to 2.08).
Materials
During the experimental task, three categories of photos (all
matching the participant’s sex) were presented. First, the par-
ticipants saw photos of their own face (Self condition). This
was managed by photographing all participants before the
experimental task in front of a white wall. These photos were
matched to the other stimuli presented during the experimental
task (i.e., pictures of celebrities and strangers; see below). This
was done by transforming them into black and white pictures
and by adjusting them systematically with regard to picture
detail, contrast, lightness, and size. Second, in the Celebrity
condition, either a photo of Brad Pitt (shown to male partici-
pants) or a photo of Angelina Jolie (shown to female partici-
pants) was presented on the screen. These photos had been
edited in the same way as the photos for the Self condition.
Third, in the Stranger condition, a stranger’s face of the same
sex as the participant was presented on the screen. The photo
of the female stranger’s face was taken from a stimulus set of
female faces that was used in a prior study, and this photo had
been rated as moderately attractive (Ohmann, Stahl,
Mussweiler, & Kedia, 2016). Similar to Ohmann et al.
(2016), we generated a second stimulus set containing 91male
faces that were pretested for attractiveness in a separate male
sample (N = 13; mean age = 23.54 years). One of these photos
that also had been rated as moderately attractive was presented
to our male participants.
Additionally, 90 stimuli showing each a different stranger´s
face were used as filler items. These photos originated from
one of the above-mentioned stimulus sets and were again
matched to the participant´s sex. They were implemented to
counteract vigilance decrement that can be caused by insuffi-
cient workload (Manly, Robertson, Galloway, & Hawkins,
1999). The participants had to rate the social competencies
of the person who was presented on the screen (see below);
including these additional 90 photos of stranger faces, they did
not only rate three stimuli but a variety of different stimuli
during the experiment.
Experimental task and procedure
After editing each participant’s photo for the Self condition,
the participants were prepared for the experimental task (pro-
grammed in E-Prime; Psychology Software Tools, Pittsburgh,
PA). Participants were placed in front of a computer screen
with their head on a chin rest (60-cm distance to the screen) to
reduce unwanted movements during the task. The experimen-
tal task was divided into 3 blocks of 120 trials. Within each
block, pictures of one’s own, the celebrity’s, and the stranger’s
face were each presented 30 times in random order and inter-
spersed with 30 different stranger faces. Blocks were separat-
ed by a 2-minute break. Every individual trial started with the
presentation of a face. Then, 800 ms after stimulus onset, an
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analogue scale appeared on the screen, and the participants
had to rate the perceived social competencies of the person
presented. This instruction was used to keep the participants
focused on the faces during the experiment. Every stimulus
remained on the screen until the rating was finished. After
stimulus offset, a blank screen occurred for 500 ms. In total,
it took participants approximately 15 minutes to complete the
task. Following the EEG experiment, participants filled out
the NARQ and were debriefed at the end of the experiment.
Behavioural data
The social competencies ratings of the photos were analysed
by averaging the scores (analogue scale ranging from 0 to
100) separately for each condition. Even though the rating
task was mainly used to focus the participant’s attention on
the faces, we analysed those data as well, in an exploratory
manner, to determine whether there were any narcissism-
related effects on the ratings.
Electrophysiological recording and pre-processing
EEG recording was similar to Ohmann et al. (2016): sixty-one
scalp electrodes were set up in accordance with the interna-
tional 10-20 system (FP1, FP2, F7, F3, Fz, F4, F8, FC5, FC1,
FC2, FC6, T7, C3, Cz, C4, T8, CP5, CP1, CP2, CP6, P7, P3,
Pz, P4, P8, FCz, O1, Oz, O2, AF7, AF3, AF4, AF8, F5, F1,
F2, F6, C3’, FT7, FC3, FC4, FT8, C4’, C5, C1, C2, C6, TP7,
CP3, CPz, CP4, TP8, P5, P1, P2, P6, PO7, PO3, POz, PO4,
PO8; Jasper, 1958). The active Ag/AgCl electrodes (actiCAP;
Brain Products, Germany) were referenced against the left
mastoid. Horizontal and vertical electrooculograms (EOG)
were derived from two electrodes located on the outer right
and left canthi and from an electrode below the left eye, re-
spectively. To record the data, BrainAmp Vision Recorder
(Brain Products) was used. Electrode impedances were held
constantly below 10 kΩ and were digitised at a sampling rate
of 500 Hz via BrainAmpDC (Brain Products). EEG data were
filtered online with a notch filter at line frequency (50 Hz) and
a low-pass filter with a cutoff frequency at 70 Hz. Several
operations were performed to analyse the recorded EEG-data
offline: A high-pass filter with a cutoff selfie frequency at
0.1 Hzwas applied and the EEG-data were, thereafter, divided
into segments ranging from 100 ms before until 800 ms after
stimulus onset. Following a baseline correction (starting
100 ms before stimulus onset), artefacts were rejected with a
criterion of ±500 μV. Confounding influences resulting from
eye movements were eliminated using the Gratton & Coles
ocular correction (Gratton, Coles, & Donchin, 1983) before a
second baseline correction starting 100 ms before stimulus
onset was conducted. Subsequently, we applied a second ar-
tefact rejection with a stricter criterion of ±100 μV. The EEG
data were averaged across the segments in each condition, and
the data from all 61 electrode sites were transformed with a
current source density (CSD) analysis. CSD transformed sig-
nals are reference-free and less affected by overlapping, no-
process related activity (e.g., Luck, 2014). For all three con-
ditions (Self, Celebrity, Stranger), grand averages were calcu-
lated. In the Self condition, 1,507 segments were used in total
to calculate the grand average waveform; the average number
of segments per participant wasM = 25.54 (SD = 5.83). In the
Celebrity condition, we could draw on 1,535 segments (M =
26.02, SD = 5.76), and in the Stranger condition, we also used
1,535 segments (M = 26.02, SD = 5.29).
Electrophysiological data analysis
In previous research, P1 and N170 amplitudes were derived
from posterior electrode sites from both hemispheres, includ-
ing the channels P7/8 and PO7/8 (Brown, El-Deredy, &
Blanchette, 2010; Keyes et al., 2010; Rellecke, Sommer, &
Schacht, 2012). In the current study, the topographical distri-
bution of the neural activity indicated by CSD-maps of the
grand averages suggested the same localization of the ERP
components (see Figure 2). We analysed peak amplitudes of
the ERP components as done in other ERP studies (see for
example Brown et al., 2010; Ratner & Amodio, 2013). We
focused on the same time windows as Ohmann et al. (2016)
for inspecting P1 (80–120 ms after stimulus onset) and N170
(120–220 ms after stimulus onset). We averaged peak ampli-
tudes across the abovementioned channels of each hemisphere
and chose those electrode sites for further statistical analyses
at which the ERP components of interest were maximal
(Ohmann et al., 2016). This implies that we derived the P1
component from the channels P8/PO8 and the N170 compo-
nent from P7/PO7. Due to technical noise at the electrode site
PO7 for three participants, the averaged EEG-signal at PO7/
P7 was slightly noisier than the signal at PO8/P8 (Figure 2).
Because the data of these three participants showed a clear P1
and N170 component at PO7 and on behalf of good practice,
we did not exclude these data.
Statistical analyses
The three dependent variables of interest (the social compe-
tencies rating as well as the P1 and N170 components) were
separately analysed with the within-subject factor Face Type
(Self, Celebrity, Stranger). To account for the nested structure
of the data (i.e., three conditions within each participant), we
used multilevel modelling (Baayen, Davidson, & Bates,
2008). Multilevel models are extensions of common regres-
sion analyses that respect dependency among data (i.e., de-
pendency due to within-subjects designs). In addition, multi-
level models also allow individual differences in the depen-
dent variables to be considered rather than averaging across
participants—here individual differences in social
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competencies ratings and both ERP components. Thus, par-
ticipants were included as random effects variable; that is,
intercepts in the dependent variable(s) were allowed to vary
between participants. To estimate model parameters we used
maximum likelihood estimation (Twisk, 2006). Allowing in-
tercepts to vary, in comparison to keeping intercepts fixed,
improved the model fit for the multilevel models testing the
P1 component, SD = 12.21 (95% CI: 10.46, 15.56), χ2 (1) =
110.47, p < 0.001, and the N170 component, SD = 11.57
(95% CI: 9.52, 14.03), χ2 (1) = 131.92, p < 0.001.
To test the general effect of Face Type on the dependent
variable(s), two dummy variables were entered as predictors
(fixed effects). As we were mainly interested in the Self con-
dition, the first dummy variable represented the differences in
the dependent variables between the Self and the Celebrity
conditions; the second dummy variable referred to the differ-
ences between the Self and the Stranger conditions. In a sec-
ond step, we included both NARQ subscales (Admiration and
Rivalry) as continuous predictor variables as well as all pos-
sible interaction terms of the predictors in the models. Treating
Admiration and Rivalry as continuous variables—instead of
dichotomizing them via median split—preserved individual-
level variation and allowed us to predict along the continuum
of these variables (Rucker, McShane, & Preacher, 2015).
Admiration and Rivalry scores were centred as recommended
by Aiken and West (1991). The analyses were run with R by
applying the R-package nlme (Pinheiro, Bates, DebRoy,
Sarkar, & R Development Core Team, 2010). To detail sig-
nificant interaction effects, follow-up simple slope analyses
were performed (Bauer & Curran, 2005). Moreover, the
Johnson-Neyman (J-N) technique was used to calculate the
regions of significance concerning the interaction effects ob-
served (Johnson & Fay, 1950; Johnson & Neyman, 1936).
Results
Social competencies rating
The multilevel model for Face Type showed that participants
ascribed significantly higher social competencies when view-
ing a celebrity’s face (mean ± standard error: 51.70 ± 4.86)
compared with their own face (49.70 ± 5.41), b = 2.00, t(116)
= 2.33, p = 0.022. The difference in the social competencies
rating between Self and Stranger (50.93 ± 4.38) was not sig-
nificant, b = 1.23, t(116) = 1.43, p = 0.157. In the next step,
both NARQ subscales as well as every possible interaction
term were entered into the model; the results of this model
are presented in Table 1. In addition to the main effect of
Face Type, we found a significant main effect of
Admiration, a significant Admiration by Rivalry interaction
and a significant interaction effect between the Self-Stranger
dummy variable and the Rivalry subscale.
To further investigate the significant interaction effect (Self
vs. Stranger x Rivalry), a simple slope analysis was conducted
with Rivalry scores being fixed one standard deviation above
and below the mean (Preacher, Curran, & Bauer, 2006). The
analysis revealed that when Rivalry scores are fixed one stan-
dard deviation below the mean, one’s own face is ascribed
significantly lower social competencies than a stranger’s face;
b = 3.39 (SE = 1.16), z = 2.91, p = 0.004. For Rivalry scores
one standard deviation above mean, the higher social compe-
tencies rating for one’s own face compared to a stranger’s face
was not significant, b = −1.53 (SE = 1.19), z = 1.28, p = 0.199.
The J-N technique indicated a significant interaction effect for
centred Rivalry scores < −0.25 and > 1.30 (Figure 1).
ERP data
Topographic maps of the CSD-transformed ERPs indicated
enhanced right hemispheric neural activity in the time interval
of the P1 component (Figure 2A) and enhanced left hemi-
spheric neural activity in the time interval of the N170 com-
ponent (Figure 2B). Figure 2C shows grand average CSD-
ERP waveforms for all three conditions that were averaged
across the right parieto-occipital (PO8) and the right parietal
electrode site (P8), where a pronounced P1 component is
shown. The N170 component is presented in Figure 2D,
which shows grand average CSD-ERPwaveforms for all three
conditions that were averaged across the left parieto-occipital
(PO7) and the left parietal electrode site (P7).
P1 component and NARQ subscales
The multilevel model testing for the general effect of Face
Type effects on the P1 amplitude (i.e., without the subscales
included) did neither reveal a significant difference between
Self (mean ± standard error: 0.187 ± 0.020 μV/cm2) and
Celebrity (0.200 ± 0.020 μV/cm2), b = 0.012, t(116) = 0.89,
p = 0.370, nor between Self and Stranger (0.180 ± 0.020 μV/
cm2), b = -0.007, t(116) = −0.51, p = 0.610. Including the
NARQ subscales and all possible interaction terms in the
model led to the results presented in Table 2.
Most importantly, differences in the P1 amplitude between
Self and Celebrity were moderated by both NARQ subscales
(Admiration and Rivalry). Interaction effects were probed as
previously described. The simple slope analysis of the Self vs.
Celebrity by Admiration interaction showed that when
Admiration is one standard deviation above the mean, the
P1 is significantly smaller when observing one’s own face
compared to a celebrity’s face; b = 0.051 (SE = 0.020), z =
2.57, p = 0.010. When looking at one standard deviation be-
low mean, the effect of the condition was not significant; b =
−0.013 (SE = 0.021), z = −0.63, p = 0.530. This finding is
again corroborated by the J-N technique and the region of
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significance for high Admiration starts at centered Admiration
scores of 0.18 (Figure 3A).
The simple slope analysis of the Self vs. Celebrity by
Rivalry interaction revealed that, when Rivalry scores
were held constant one standard deviation below the
mean, P1 is significantly higher when viewing a
celebrity’s face compared with when viewing one’s own
face, b = 0.047 (SE = 0.019), z = 2.52, p = 0.012. The
difference in P1 amplitude for viewing a celebrity com-
pared with one’s own face when Rivalry scores were
fixed one standard deviation above mean was not signif-
icant, b = −0.009 (SE = 0.019), z = 0.46, p = 0.643. The J-
N technique indicated a significant interaction effect for
centred Rivalry scores below −0.21 (Figure 3B).
Figure 1. Interaction effect of Rivalry with face type (Self, Stranger) on
the social competencies rating. The analogue scale of the social
competencies rating ranged from 0 to 100. Grey areas indicate the
regions of significance of this interaction effect. The interaction effect is
illustrated (only) for the range of the observed centred Rivalry scores in
our study.
Table 1 Parameter estimates for the multilevel model analysing effects on the social competencies rating
b SE b 95% CI p
Intercept 50.07 0.64 48.85, 51.29 <0.001
Self vs. Celebrity 1.87 0.86 0.22, 3.53 0.032
Self vs. Stranger 0.93 0.86 −0.73, 2.58 0.286
Admiration −3.53 10.43 −5.55, −1.51 0.001
Rivalry 1.74 0.90 0.01, 5.46 0.059
Admiration x Rivalry −3.65 16.89 −6.92, −0.38 0.035
Self vs. Celebrity x Admiration 2.77 14.08 0.07, 5.46 0.052
Self vs. Stranger x Admiration 3.87 14.09 1.17, 6.56 0.007
Self vs. Celebrity x Rivalry −1.94 12.17 -4.27, 0.39 0.114
Self vs. Stranger x Rivalry −3.47 12.17 −5.80, −1.14 0.005
Self vs. Celebrity x Admiration x Rivalry 1.23 22.82 −3.14, 5.60 0.591
Self vs. Stranger x Admiration x Rivalry 2.96 22.82 −1.40, 7.33 0.197
SE = standard error; CI = confidence interval.
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N170 component and NARQ subscales
The multilevel model for the general effect of Face Type
on the N170 amplitude (i.e. without the NARQ sub-
scales) indicated a significantly higher N170 peak ampli-
tude for Self (−0.107 ± 0.019 μV/cm2) than for Celebrity
(−0.084 ± 0.018 μV/cm2), b = 0.023, t(116) = 2.11, p =
0.037. We also found a higher N170 peak amplitude in
the Self than in the Stranger condition (−0.074 ± 0.016
μV/cm2), b = 0.033, t(116) = 3.10, p = 0.002. Note that
beta-coefficients are positive as the N170 represents a
negative deflection in the ERP. Including the NARQ
subscales and every possible interaction term led to the
results presented in Table 3. Most importantly, we found
that the Self-Stranger difference in the N170 amplitude
was moderated by Rivalry.
Figure 2. Event-related potentials. Topographic maps of mean CSD-
transformed ERPs for the three conditions (Self, Celebrity, Stranger) at
(A) 100 ms and (B) 170 ms after stimulus presentation. (C) Grand aver-
age CSD-ERP waveforms that were averaged across electrode sites PO8
and P8 for all three conditions. The grey area indicates the time window
that was used to inspect the P1 amplitude. (D) Grand average CSD-ERP
waveforms that were averaged across electrode sites PO7 and P7 for all
three conditions. The grey area shows the time window that was used to
inspect the N170 amplitude.
Table 2. Parameter estimates for the multilevel model analysing effects on P1 (μV/cm2)
b SE b 95% CI p
Intercept 0.182 0.020 0.143, 0.221 <0.001
Self vs. Celebrity 0.019 0.014 −0.007, 0.046 0.171
Self vs. Stranger −0.002 0.014 −0.028, 0.025 0.896
Admiration −0.063 0.033 −0.127, 0.001 0.063
Rivalry 0.047 0.029 −0.009, 0.102 0.110
Admiration x Rivalry 0.049 0.054 −0.055, 0.153 0.369
Self vs. Celebrity x Admiration 0.045 0.023 0.002, 0.089 0.047
Self vs. Stranger x Admiration 0.026 0.023 −0.017, 0.070 0.246
Self vs. Celebrity x Rivalry −0.040 0.020 −0.077, −0.002 0.046
Self vs. Stranger x Rivalry −0.004 0.020 −0.041, 0.034 0.858
Self vs. Celebrity x Admiration x Rivalry −0.067 0.037 −0.137, 0.003 0.072
Self vs. Stranger x Admiration x Rivalry −0.052 0.037 −0.122, 0.018 0.157
SE = standard error; CI = confidence interval.
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A simple slope analysis was conducted to probe for
the interaction. For Rivalry scores held constant 1 stan-
dard deviation above the mean, the results indicate a
significant reduction of the N170 peak amplitude when
observing one’s own face compared with viewing a
stranger’s face, b = 0.060 (SE = 0.015), z = 3.97, p <
0.001. For one standard deviation below the mean, the
difference between both conditions was not significant,
b = 0.016 (SE = 0.015), z = 1.08, p < 0.279. The J-N
technique indicated a significant interaction effect for
centralised Rivalry scores > −0.43 (Figure 4).
Discussion
We found that Admiration and Rivalry, two narcissism di-
mensions (Back et al., 2013), varied with neural correlates
of face processing, within the first 200 ms after stimulus onset.
By showing participants their own face, a celebrity’s face, and
a stranger’s face, we discovered moderating effects of
Admiration and Rivalry on two ERP components: The P1
component covaried with Admiration while both the P1 and
the N170 component covaried with Rivalry. The results only
partly reflected our assumptions that P1 and N170 varied for
Figure 3. Interaction effects of (A) Admiration and (B) Rivalry with face type (Self, Celebrity) on P1. Grey areas indicate the regions of significance of
these interaction effects. The interaction effects are illustrated (only) for the range of the observed centred Admiration and Rivalry scores in our study.
Table 3. Parameter estimates for the multilevel model analysing effects on N170 (μV/cm2)
b SE b 95% CI P
Intercept −0.108 0.018 −0.142, −0.073 <0.001
Self vs. Celebrity 0.025 0.011 0.004, 0.046 0.023
Self vs. Stranger 0.038 0.011 0.017, 0.059 <0.001
Admiration 0.045 0.029 −0.011, 0.010 0.127
Rivalry −0.031 0.025 −0.080, 0.018 0.230
Admiration*Rivalry 0.008 0.047 −0.084, 0.0100 0.863
Self vs. Celebrity*Admiration 0.020 0.018 −0.014, 0.055 0.261
Self vs. Stranger*Admiration −0.005 0.018 −0.039, 0.030 0.795
Self vs. Celebrity*Rivalry 0.018 0.016 −0.012, 0.048 0.245
Self vs. Stranger*Rivalry 0.031 0.016 0.002, 0.061 0.046
Self vs. Celebrity*Admiration*Rivalry −0.026 0.029 −0.082, 0.030 0.367
Self vs. Stranger*Admiration*Rivalry −0.049 0.029 -0.104, 0.007 0.096
SE = standard error; CI = confidence interval.
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participants high in Admiration when viewing one´s own face
and for participants high in Rivalry when viewing a stranger´s
face. We discuss possible mechanisms underlying the ob-
served effects below.
Narcissism and very early face processing reflected in
P1
Results for P1 showed that both Admiration and Rivalry mod-
erated the effect of the Self-Celebrity comparison. Viewing
one’s own face compared with a stranger’s face, however,
was neither influenced by Admiration nor Rivalry. Thus, the
following discussion about possible influences of Admiration
and Rivalry on P1 focuses on the Self-Celebrity comparison.
Admiration and attentional inhibition of one’s own face
We mentioned earlier that the P1 was interpreted as an indi-
cator of attentional selection processes determining which in-
formation enters (and does not enter) consciousness for further
stimulus processing (Railo et al., 2011). Hereafter, it could be
reasoned that the lower P1 for participants with high
Admiration when viewing themselves compared to a celebrity
reflects the inhibition of attention to their own face. This
seems to be a paradox at first sight: One could argue that
individuals high in narcissism process photos of their face
even more intensely because of the exaggerated positive
self-views they report (Campbell, Rudich, & Sedikides,
2002) and the joy of looking at themselves, as stated in the
Narcissistic Personality Inventory (Raskin & Terry, 1988).
However, one also could argue that individuals with high
Admiration scores avoid processing their own face to protect
their explicit grandiosity against potentially contradicting
information—meaning protecting their grandiosity against
the perception of an “imperfect” photo. According to the con-
sistency theory of psychological functioning (Grawe, 2004;
Grawe, 2007), the human organism has developed control
mechanisms to coordinate simultaneously ongoing processes
to ensure their consistency (Rumelhart & McClelland, 1986).
Inconsistency of processes—reflected for example in con-
scious or unconscious motivational conflict—impairs mental
functioning, leads to distress, and may in the long-term cause
mental disorders and even suicidal tendencies (Grawe, 2004).
Thus, attentional inhibition can be regarded as one mechanism
to ensure consistency of psychological functioning (Grawe,
2004; Diamond, 2013). When, for example, a particular mo-
tivational goal is activated (such as the goal to feel grandiose
in people with high Admiration), any cognitions, emotions,
and (in this case) perceptions that interfere with this goal are
inhibited to ensure consistency and, thereby, goal-directed
behaviour (Grawe, 2007). Accordingly, the lower P1 might
reflect a mechanism related to narcissism that serves the
Figure 4. Interaction effect of Rivalry with face type (Self, Stranger) on
N170. The grey area indicates the regions of significance of this
interaction effect. The interaction effect is illustrated (only) for the range
of the observed centred Rivalry scores in our study. N170 represents a
negative deflection in the ERP.
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protection of one’s grandiosity against inconsistent percep-
tions, that is, a potentially “imperfect” picture.
Of course, a photo of one’s own face does not have to be
ego-threatening but could rather provide evidence for one’s
attractiveness; however, considering the overarching motiva-
tional goal of experiencing grandiosity in narcissism (Morf,
Torchetti, & Schürch, 2011; Back et al., 2013), the spontane-
ous, unadorned view of one’s own face may actually fall be-
hind that goal. That is, the perceptual input (photo) is incon-
sistent with the exaggerated grandiose cognitions and the
overestimated self-view of their attractiveness (Gabriel,
Critelli, & Ee, 1994). Moreover, some research suggested that
the overtly, explicitly stated high self-view of people with
high narcissism scores is actually accompanied by a rather
low implicit self-view (Zeigler-Hill & Jordan, 2011; Zeigler-
Hill, 2006). Thus, individuals with high narcissism scores
seem not necessarily to experience grandiosity or perfectness
at all levels; there seem to be aspects of themselves that they
may not fully endorse or that they experience as falling behind
their grandiose standards. Thus, the lower P1 might reflect
attentional inhibition to shield the explicit grandiosity against
this implicit vulnerability (Morf et al., 2011; Horvath &Morf,
2009).
Admiration and expectancy-driven self-perception
Besides attentional inhibition, the influence of grandiose
fantasies (associated with Admiration; Back et al., 2013)
on perception also could explain the alterations in P1.
These cognitive structures could be connected to an ex-
pectancy-driven perception of one’s face, while stimulus-
driven processing of the actual photo might be tuned
down (Gilbert & Li, 2013; Engel, Fries, & Singer,
2001). More precisely, perceptions of one’s face might
be driven by expectations about one’s attractive looks
instead of the actual sensory input. As a consequence,
fewer neural resources might be mobilised for processing
the sensory input, which could result in a lower P1. In
line with this, several researchers suggested that percep-
tion is not only a passive and stimulus-driven but fore-
most a constructive and expectancy-driven process in
which existing cognitive structures can highly modulate
the processing of sensory input (Gilbert & Li, 2013;
Engel et al., 2001; Damasio, 1990; Edelman, 1989).
Interestingly, P1 was shown to vary with low-level in-
formation of visual stimuli (Rossion & Jacques, 2008),
and it is tempting, although speculative, to say that the
lower P1, which was observed for high Admiration
scores in the Self condition, reflected the reduced pro-
cessing of the low-level features of one’s face.
If cognitive structures representing one’s grandiosity mod-
ulate early information processing, this might account for ex-
ample for the findings that highly narcissistic people
overestimate their attractiveness (Gabriel et al., 1994) and
their performance (Campbell, Goodie, & Foster, 2004).
These findings might be a result of highly expectancy-driven
self-perception, whereas processing of actual sensory input
from self-relevant stimuli might habitually be reduced in nar-
cissism. Obviously, this interpretation does not contradict but
rather complement the attentional inhibition hypotheses.
While the attentional inhibition hypothesis emphasises that
one’s grandiosity needs to be protected (against inconsistent
self-relevant information), this interpretation accentuates the
fact that expectations of grandiosity highly influence the per-
ceptional process. Both mechanisms can co-occur and, in ei-
ther way, narcissistic grandiosity is stabilised.
Admiration and attentional facilitation to people of high
social status
The previously discussed hypotheses concentrated on the pro-
cessing of self-photos. At the same time, however, there could
have been intensified processing of the celebrity’s face, which
also might have contributed to the P1 difference between Self
and Celebrity. Participants with high Admiration scores might
have paid special attention to the Celebrity photos, leading to a
higher P1. Campbell and Green (2007) postulated that highly
narcissistic people tend to affiliate with people with a high
social status, which serves to stabilise one’s own grandiosity.
Consequently, people exhibiting high social status can be so-
cially highly relevant to narcissistic individuals, and it was
shown that the social relevance of another person leads to
intensified face processing, which is reflected in an enlarged
P1 (Bublatzky, Gerdes, White, Riemer, & Alpers, 2014).
Thus, the relatively high P1 amplitude in participants with
high Admiration in the Celebrity condition, compared with
the Self condition, might reflect the assignment of social rel-
evance to famous people.
Rivalry and comparison with people of high social status
Although the two NARC subscales are positively correlated
(Back et al., 2013), we found a quite different pattern for P1
and Rivalry. Interestingly, participants with low Rivalry
showed a significantly smaller P1 amplitude when observing
their own face compared with a celebrity’s face. High Rivalry
participants did not show a significant P1 difference between
viewing one’s own face and that of a celebrity. Back et al.
(2013) suggested that the mechanism of Rivalry incorporates
the tendency to compare oneself with perceived social rivals.
Consequently, not only the celebrity’s but also one’s own face
should be important stimuli for high Rivalry participants, lead-
ing to more intense processing of both stimuli. This might be
reflected in the relatively high and not significantly different
P1 in the Self and Celebrity condition. In contrast, for partic-
ipants with low Rivalry scores, a picture of one’s face might
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be less emotionally salient compared with a celebrity’s face,
leading to a lower P1 amplitude (Vuilleumier, 2005).
Rivalry moderated the effect of the Self-Celebrity compar-
ison on the P1 amplitude in an opposite way than Admiration.
This finding is interesting considering the high positive corre-
lation of both subscales (r = 0.61; Back et al., 2013). The
opposite effect of Admiration and Rivalry on very early face
processing supports that both dimensions should be distin-
guished as different pathways that enable highly narcissistic
people to stabilise their grandiose self-view (Back et al.,
2013).
Rivalry and structural encoding of one’s own face
indicated by N170
With regard to the N170 amplitude, reflecting higher-
order face-sensitive perceptual processes at a later pro-
cessing stage (Rossion & Jacques, 2011), we successfully
replicated the so-called self-effect (Keyes et al., 2010);
i.e., enhanced N170 amplitudes for one’s own face com-
pared with a celebrity’s and a stranger’s face. Also, we
found a moderation effect of Rivalry on the Self-Stranger
difference. The difference between Self and Stranger
(higher N170 in the Self condition) was larger for higher
Rivalry scores. Only for participants with very low scores
in Rivalry, there was no significant Self-Stranger
difference.
As stated above, Ofan et al. (2014) demonstrated that the
N170 is higher when participants are afraid of showing racial
prejudices. The authors argued that social anxiety could facil-
itate visual face processing activity, indicated by a higher
N170, to promote adequate response strategies for preventing
social disapproval because of showing racial prejudices.
Transferred to our findings, a higher N170 in the Self (than
in the Stranger) condition for increasing Rivalry scores also
might reflect the mobilisation of defensive response strategies.
In contrast to Admiration, Rivalry is accompanied by massive
efforts to protect one’s grandiosity from real and imagined
attacks and with constant fears of ego-threats (Back et al.,
2013). When the own face of an individual scoring high in
Rivalry becomes the focus of attention, this self-protection
strategy might be activated, leading to enhanced stimulus pro-
cessing of their own face—as reflected in a higher N170. This
might enable the individual to prepare for potentially ego-
threatening feedback and to initiate self-protective and aggres-
sive behaviour if necessary—as Back et al. (2013) postulated
for the mechanism of Rivalry. Thus, whereas Admiration
might be connected to the reduced processing of one’s own
face at an early face processing stage (lower P1) to possibly
protect one’s grandiosity, Rivalry might be associated with a
facilitated face processing at a later stage (enhanced N170),
which could reflect the mobilisation of defensive systems.
Rivalry and the social competencies rating:
devaluation of strangers
In addition to ERP components, we investigated the variations
of Admiration and Rivalry with the social competencies rat-
ing. In general, participants gave higher social competencies
ratings for celebrities than for themselves. Considering the
narcissism scales, we found that Rivalry showed a moderating
effect on the Self-Stranger comparison: Participants high in
Rivalry ascribed higher social competencies to their own face
than to the stranger´s face. In contrast, participants low in
Rivalry ascribed more social competencies to strangers and
attributed less to themselves. This is consistent with the pos-
tulation that Rivalry, as a strategy to maintain narcissistic
grandiosity, is associated with the devaluation of other people
and striving for supremacy (Back et al., 2013). Thereby, the
social competencies rating pointed to the ecological validity of
the Rivalry scale.
Limitations and Future Research
Unfortunately, it was not possible to create a baseline
condition that would have allowed for a comparison with
Self, Celebrity, and Stranger. With regard to narcissism,
every kind of face is possibly connected to unique alter-
ations in sensory processing because of the broad influ-
ence of narcissism on self- and other-perception (Morf
et al., 2011). Thus, it was only possible to compare the
different face conditions with each other. Consequently,
the interactions between face-comparisons and the narcis-
sism dimensions had to be interpreted from the viewpoint
of both face conditions involved in the respective compar-
ison. Therefore, in the future, we need to create a (more)
neutral condition (e.g., an object) for comparison.
Furthermore, it is still difficult to interpret the meaning
of larger amplitudes of a component: an increase could
mean either more intense processing or stronger inhibi-
tion. Thus, a further systematic investigation of the neural
correlates and their personality-related variations is inev-
itable. Moreover, because we only chose one well-known
female and male celebrity in the current study, we cannot
rule out that the observed pattern cannot be generalised to
all famous people. Therefore, other celebrities and other
people with high social status could be used in future
research. Finally, we want to discuss the sample size in
the current study. There is no general convention
concerning power analyses in the multilevel approach
given the variety of different multilevel models. With
simulations, Maas and Hox (2005) demonstrated that a
minimum sample size of 50 at the group level is needed
to ensure acceptable accuracy of parameter estimates. The
current study met this criterion with a sample size of 59 at
the group level. Small sample sizes at level 1 do not pose
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a problem by themselves (Hox, 2013). Thus, the current
results constituted a promising lead we should explore in
future studies.
For future research, it would be interesting to alter pictures
of the participant with regard to attractiveness and to investi-
gate whether potential effects on P1 are moderated by
Admiration. This could be realised by having participants
bring a favourable photo of themselves to the experiment
and contrast this with an unadorned photo taken by the
experimenter—of course, one would have to match these pic-
tures according to low-level features and would have to verify
subjective differences in attractiveness with a manipulation
check. Whereas participants with low Admiration scores
might process pictures of themselves that vary in attractive-
ness differently. Due to potential emotional impacts of advan-
tageous and less advantageous photos, individuals high in
Admiration might not show these variations because of the
discussed phenomena concerning attentional inhibition and
expectancy-driven perception. Furthermore, it would be inter-
esting to examine whether there are similar variations of
Rivalry and Admiration with P1 and N170 for other self-
relevant stimuli, such as someone’s name, that also elicit P1
and N170 (Tacikowski, Jednorog, Marchewka, & Nowicka,
2011). Finally, it would be interesting to expand the current
research to the investigation of other well-studied ERPs. It
might be worthwhile examining whether there are associa-
tions between narcissism and ERP components occurring in
error processing. Previous research demonstrated that narcis-
sism is associated with specific reactions to failure (Kernis, &
Sun, 1994; Campbell et al., 2004), which also might be based
on neural variations in very early error processing.
Conclusions
Inspired by the Greek myth of Narcissus, the starting point of
our modern understanding of narcissism, we were interested
in the question of whether narcissism is connected to unique
alterations in face perception on a neural level. We demon-
strated that two dimensions of narcissism, Admiration and
Rivalry, vary in their own specific ways with two ERP com-
ponents of face processing, P1 and N170. The current results
exemplify that ERP research is well suited to uncover auto-
matic neural responses in narcissism and might, in future stud-
ies, further elucidate the very nature of this complex and con-
troversially discussed construct.
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